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COMMENTS
SILENCING SPEECH IN THE WORKPLACE:
RE-EXAMINING THE USE OF SPECIFIC
SPEECH INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR TITLE
VII HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT WORK
CLAIMS
SONALI DAS*

One of the truths we hold to be self-evident is that a
government that tells its citizens what they may say will soon
be dictatingwhat they may think. But in a country that puts
such a high premium on freedom, we cannot allow ourselves
to be the captives of orthodox, culturally imposed thinking
patterns. Indeed, I can conceive no imprisonment so complete,
no subjugation so absolute, no debasement so abject as the
enslavement of the mind.1
INTRODUCTION

The freedom to speak the words one chooses is fundamental
to the American conception of a free society and is subject to
strong legal protections.2 As such, it is not difficult to imagine that
a law prohibiting certain individuals or groups from expressing
their opinions in a public forum would draw considerable criticism
from the American public and ultimately be doomed in the courts.
But, imagine a court ordering an employer to stop his
employees from using the words "nigger," "polack," "kike," "spic,"
"guinea," "honky," "mick," "coon," and "black bitch" in the
workplace or risk criminal contempt charges.3 Further, imagine
*J.D. Candidate, June 2001.
1. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Syst., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 895 (Cal. 1999)
(Brown, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (refusing to permit
assumptions that one can forbid particular words without also running a

substantial risk of suppression of ideas).
3. See Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
affd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding an injunction based on finding
that defendants subjected plaintiffs to racial and ethnic slurs resulting in a
hostile work environment). The injunction in Snell forbade the posting or
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the order forbade any racial, ethnic, or religious slurs.4 While most
people consider such speech abhorrent and repugnant, few would
contend that government regulation of such words, regardless of
where they are spoken, does not raise serious First Amendment
5
concerns.
Surprisingly, the courts view the situation differently. Legal
remedies for workplace discrimination stemming from Title VII6

distribution of derogatory bulletins, cartoons, and other written material
within a jail by correction officers. Id.
4. Id. See also Aguilar 980 P.2d at 848-50 (upholding the constitutionality
of a specific speech injunction requiring defendant's supervisor to "cease and
desist from using any derogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed at, or
descriptive of, Hispanic/Latino employees" of Avis). Aguilar stemmed from a
1993 lawsuit in which seventeen Latino employees of Avis Rent a Car sued the
company and its managers for creating a hostile and abusive work
environment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.
Code, § 129000 et seq.), California's version of Title VII. Id. at 849. The
complaint alleged that their supervisor repeatedly verbally harassed plaintiffs.
Id. The court noted that Lawrence routinely called only the Latino employees
derogatory names, and continually demeaned them on the basis of their race,
national origin and lack of English language skills. Id. A San Francisco jury
awarded eight of the workers $135,000 in damages. Id. at 849-50. Moreover,
Superior Court Judge Carlos Bea ordered Lawrence to stop using such
language and ordered Avis not to permit it in the future. Id. at 850. Avis did
not contest the damage award but appealed the court's injunctive order,
arguing that such an injunction amounted to an unconstitutional prior
restraint on free speech, under the United States Constitution and the
California Constitution. Id. at 852. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
injunction was constitutionally sound and did not amount to a prior restraint.
Id. at 850. However, the court did reverse part of the injunction and
remanded it to the trial court with directions to "redraft the injunction in a
manner that.. .limits its scope to the workplace" and furthermore, to precisely
describe the content of the enjoined speech by providing examples of the
prohibited epithets. Id. The California Supreme Court granted review and in
a 4-3 decision, held that the injunction was not an invalid prior restraint on
speech, either under the First Amendment or the free speech provisions of the
California Constitution. Id. at 861. The court stated that the order was not
an invalid prior restraint because it was issued only after the jury determined
that defendants had engaged in employment discrimination, and that the
order simply precluded defendants from continuing their unlawful activity.
Id. However, three separate dissenting judges in the case all rejected the
majority's position. The dissenters each argued that the order constituted a
prior restraint because it restricted speech based on the mere assumption that
continued utterance of epithets by the defendant would invariably rise to the
level of creating a hostile and abusive environment again. Id. at 878.
5. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1793 (1992) (arguing that workplace verbal harassment
law by its nature implicates the First Amendment).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000) (allowing
injured parties demonstrating a hostile or abusive environment to collect back
pay or injunctive relief). Congressional amendments in 1991 expanded the
remedies available to plaintiffs to include compensatory and punitive
damages. Id.
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have faced few First Amendment challenges.7 Too often, this is
because many courts deciding harassment lawsuits fail to even
consider free speech issues when determining how to remedy
discriminatory work environments.8 One reason may be the
intense focus today towards eliminating discrimination completely
from American society.9 Many people consider bigoted speech
antithetical to that goal and undeserving of protection."°
Recent cases are evidence of the price society pays for
ignoring the First Amendment implications of harassment law's
injunctive remedies." The willingness of some courts to issue
broad speech injunctions has set the goal of equality in the
workplace and the right to free speech in the workplace on a
collision course.
This Comment will argue that remedial speech injunctions
issued pursuant to a finding that sexist or racist speech created a
hostile or abusive work environment are unconstitutional. Part I
7. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1793; cf. DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police
Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating whether some
applications of Title VII are necessarily unconstitutional "has not yet been
fully explored"). Frustrated with the Supreme Court's evasive attitude toward
Title VII, the DeAngelis court called the Supreme Court's pronouncements on
the constitutional issues implicated by Title VII "unilluminating." Id. But see
Kingsley Browne, Title VII As Censorship: Hostile Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 484 (1992) (arguing that
harassment law is unconstitutional when applied to speech guarantees
recognized by the First Amendment).
8. See Snell, 611 F. Supp. at 531 (stating that for "reasons beyond the
scope of this opinion, the First Amendment does not bar appropriate relief in
the instant case of discrimination of the workplace.") The court went on to
state that this case did not directly raise such serious constitutional issues
directly. Id. See also EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1070
(lth Cir. 1990) (upholding injunction prohibiting racially abusive language in
the workplace without addressing free speech issues). But see Volokh, supra
note 5, at 1812 (arguing that harassment law is generally unconstitutional
when applied to speech); Cecilee Price-Huish, Because the Constitution
Requires It and Because Justice Demands It; Specific Speech Injunctive Relief
for Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claims, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J.
193, 210 (1998) (advocating specific speech injunctions like that issued in
Snell).
9. Maria La Ganga, Justices Uphold Workplace Ban on Racial Slurs, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1999, at Al.
10. See id. (advocating specific speech injunctive relief in Aguilar, the
ACLU applauded the court's decree). In its amicus brief to the Aguilar court,
the ACLU, a staunch supporter of liberal free speech guarantees, stated it
supported "limits on the unrestrained speech of bigots in the workplace,
particularly when they are in positions of authority on the job." Id.
11. Private employers may implement their own anti-harassment policies,
which arguably could include restricting speech in the workplace. See
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (stating that the First
Amendment only applies to government speech restrictions). However, this
Comment will only focus on the constitutionality of the government requiring
employers, under threat of liability, to suppress harassing speech.
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of this Comment discusses the historical roots of Title VII, the use
of injunctions under Title VII, First Amendment law on prior
restraints, and finally the recent amendments to Title VII
authorizing legal remedies such as damages. Part II will focus on
how the use of specific speech injunctions to remedy Title VII
violations act as an unconstitutional prior restraint of protected
speech. Finally, Part III advocates the use of damages as the
proper and most effective way to correct past and prevent future
discrimination in the workplace.
I.

ENDING DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TITLE

VII

AND ITS

PROTECTIONS

Title VII, which imposed a new standard for liability upon
employers, is a seminal Act" in the development of employment
discrimination law.1"
The Act authorizes employees to seek
injunctive relief in order to remedy past and prevent future
workplace harassment. 4 However, many courts are reluctant to
issue injunctions targeting specific speech because of their
tendency to forbid certain speech prior to utterance." Historically,
First Amendment doctrine has rejected content-based restrictions
on speech and categorized these restrictions as unconstitutional
prior restraints. 6 In an effort to compensate injured workers,
Congress, in 1991, expanded the remedies available to employees
under Title VII and authorized the courts to award damages. 7
A. The History of Title VII
By far the most significant development in employment
discrimination law this century was the adoption of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.1' The Act states that it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to "discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 9 In the landmark case Meritor
12.
13.
14.
15.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
Price-Huish, supra note 8,at 197.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
See McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961, 977 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)

(refusing issuance of speech injunction to remedy Title VII violation because it
would constitute unlawful authorization of "gag order" on defendant's speech).
But see Ryan v. Warrensburg, 117 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1938) (suggesting in
dicta that injunction can issue against further publication of defamatory

statements once plaintiff secures a jury verdict). However, few courts follow
Missouri's precedent.
16. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).

17. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 21, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (1994).
18. Price-Huish, supra note 8,at 197.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) states:
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail
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Savings Bank v. Vinson," the Supreme Court interpreted this
language to mean that employers may be liable for speech and
conduct that creates a hostile and abusive work environment.2'
The Court subsequently held that even words alone violate Title
VII, if they have the "purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating,
22
hostile, or offensive working environment."
Of course, not every utterance of a racial slur or sexual
comment violates Title VII.2 ' The Court has recognized that for
verbal harassment to be actionable, a complainant must
demonstrate that the "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or ... to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
Id.
20. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)
21. See Meritor 477 U.S. at 65 (defining actionable speech for a Title VII
sexual harassment violation to be "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature... [that]
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment" quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 CFR § 16.04.11 (a) (1985)). The
Court stated that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
detailed in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrates Congress'
intent to eliminate the unequal treatment of men and women and racial
minorities in the workplace. Id. at 64. The Meritor Court also held so long as
the environment would be reasonably perceived as hostile and abusive, there
is no need for a complainant to also demonstrate that it was psychologically
injurious. Id.
22. Id. at 65. See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 18-22 (1993)
(allowing speech alone to serve as the basis for a hostile environment claim for
the first time). The Harris Court imposed limitations on plaintiffs relying on
speech to establish their hostile environment claims. Id. Harris stated that
the offending words must rise to the standard of being sufficiently severe as
perceived by a reasonable employee and must be pervasive in the workplace
making it impossible for an employee to function under his employment terms.
Id. at 21.
23. See Meritor 477 U.S. at 67 (holding the "mere utterance of an ...
epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" does not create a
burdensome workplace for an employee under Title VII). See also Aguilar v.
Avis Rent a Car Sys. Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 878 (1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(highlighting the majority's concession that not every isolated racial slur or
derogatory comment necessarily violates the FEHA or Title VII). In addition,
if the complainant does not subjectively perceive the environment to be
abusive, the speech or conduct has not sufficiently altered his employment
conditions and therefore, does not produce an actionable claim under Title VII.
Id. at 169.
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insult... [must be] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment."24 In essence, a plaintiff must demonstrate
a repeated pattern of harassment, not just isolated or occasional
comments.25
B. Awarding Injunctive Relief Under Title VII
Once a complainant satisfies the burden of proof for liability,
the court must determine the adequate remedy.26 Until 1991, only
equitable relief, primarily in the form of an injunction prohibiting
further harassment 27 and ordering back pay, was available in a
Title VII case.28
Historically, courts have considered injunctions as the
preferred remedy for civil rights litigation. This is because many
courts assumed other remedies would not always insure the
protection of an individual's constitutional rights as fully in
certain situations.29 Courts faced with such difficult tasks as
24. Harris,510 U.S. at 21.
25. See Id. at 23 (stating that courts evaluating hostile or abusive
environment claims must look to all the circumstances surrounding the speech
or conduct). The primary factor distinguishing actionable and non-actionable
speech is whether the verbal comments directed at the employee were merely
offensive utterances or whether the comments were frequent and severe
enough to interfere with an employee's ability to function in the workplace.
Id.
26. See generally Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 (1977) (holding "case
or controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution
dictates that a plaintiff cannot maintain a suit in which no relief can be
granted). Emotional satisfaction does not qualify as relief. Id.
27. See, e.g., Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1132
(4th Cir. 1995) (holding equitable relief ordinarily available in Title VII
workplace harassment cases is the issuance of an injunction prohibiting
further harassment, if such an order is necessary under the circumstances to
prevent further abuse).
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (West 1994) states:
[I]f the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
...which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay, . . . or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate.
Id.
29. See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 6 (1978) (arguing

that after Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), lower courts looked to
injunctions as an effective means of protecting individual's civil rights). Fiss
claims Brown gave injunctive relief special prominence in the fight against
discrimination: "School desegregation not only gave the injunction a greater
currency, it also presented the injunction with new challenges, in terms of
both the enormity and the kind of tasks it was assigned." Id. at 4. The
injunction was the tool courts used to restructure national education systems
and thus, the potential to effectively remedy other instances where civil rights
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desegregating schools or preventing Jim Crow voting laws
depended on injunctive relief primarily because it was the only
effective remedy in those specific situations."° In an effort to
eradicate discrimination in general, courts went so far as to hold
that judges have not merely the power, but the duty to correct and
eliminate the present effects of past discrimination." Subsequent
courts examining Title VII issues drew on the civil rights cases as
precedent for issuing injunctions to remedy racial or sexual
discrimination that caused a hostile environment."3
However, injunctive relief is not mandatory in Title VII
cases." Indeed, when a plaintiff seeks an injunction aimed at
prohibiting speech in the workplace, courts presume such orders
Thus, the proponent of the
carry great risks of censorship.'
injunction must overcome a high burden in order to obtain
injunctive relief in such situations.3'
In general, plaintiffs requesting injunctive relief must prove
that legal remedies are clearly inadequate to correct past
discrimination and prevent it in the future. 6 Additionally, the
are at risk warrants the continued use of injunctions. Id.
30. Id. at 87-89.
31. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (stating
that where racial discrimination is concerned, courts have not merely the
power but the obligation to render a decree which will so far as possible
remedy the discriminatory effects of the past as well as prevent further
discrimination in the future).
32. FISS, supra note 29, at 87.
33. See NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 693 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding only cases with "abundant" evidence of consistent past discrimination
The evidence must be clear and
justify mandatory injunctive relief).
convincing and the proponent of the injunction must show that there is no
reasonable probability of the defendant's compliance with the law. Id.
Without evidence of the kind of lingering effects of the kind that flowed from
the long-term systematic discrimination, injunctive relief is not warranted.
Id. See, e.g., Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 703 F. Supp. 466, 469 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(holding injunction is not warranted when specific actions are taken to
alleviate the effects of past discrimination). In Spencer, the employer obeyed
the plaintiff's request for a transfer to a similar position in a different G.E.
office at the same pay and offering the same employment responsibilities after
she demonstrated she was sexually harassed and suffered a legal injury. Id.
Furthermore, the court stated it had already awarded the plaintiff nominal
damages for proving her hostile environment claim against her employer. Id.
As such, damages remedied to the legal extent practicable the effects of the
plaintiffs harassment. Id.
34. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994)
(stating that whenever injunctions prohibit speech in some manner, the risk of
such orders being unconstitutional is great). See also In re Providence Journal
Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1348 (1st Cir. 1986) (emphasizing the Supreme Court has
declared the principal purpose of the First Amendment is to prevent prior
restraints and that in two centuries of the Court's existence, a prior restraint
on pure speech has never been upheld).
35. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764.
36. See McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961, 978 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:321

plaintiff must present "clear and convincing proof' that after final
judgment the defendant is likely to continue to act in violation of
Title VII. 37 Although proponents of injunctive relief often argue
that a prior finding of discriminatory conduct on the part of a
defendant is an important consideration when determining
whether to issue an injunction," courts have consistently held that
an injunction should not be granted soley on this broad
generalization."
Furthermore, courts have stated that a
presumption that one who violates the law once is likely to do so
again is not legally sufficient to support an injunction. °
In applying the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the early federal
courts regularly enjoined employers from engaging in any
discriminatory employment practices both in potential recruitment
and hiring 4 and after an employee was retained. 41 Over time,

(stating the Supreme Court has consistently held prior restraints
impermissible where a sufficient after-the-fact remedy exists to correct any
potential harm caused by the speech).
37. See NAACP, 693 F.2d at 1370 (discussing the burden of proof on a
proponent requesting injunctive relief in a Title VII hostile environment
claim).
38. See generally United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 630 (1953).
The Court affirmed a district court's holding that refused injunctive relief
because a "reasonable expectation that the wrong would be repeated did not
exist." Id. In Grant, the Court considered the defendant's bona fide expressed
intention to comply with the law and in some cases, the character of the past
violations. Id. at 635. See also NAACP, 693 F.2d at 1370 (holding denial of
injunctive relief was an abuse of the district court's discretion in light of
finding of hostile work environment and the "abundant" evidence of prior
discrimination).
39. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 833
(5th Cir. 1979) (holding proponent of an injunction cannot base prior restraint
on broad generalization that "once a sinner always a sinner."). In Eaves, a
religious
organization
and
others
brought
suit
challenging
the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance regulating the distribution of
literature and solicitation of funds at a city-owned airport. Id. at 816. The
defendant argued the ordinance was permissible because anyone who has
violated an ordinance is likely to do so again. Id. at 833. The Court rejected
the argument. Id. at 834. See, e.g., Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587
F.2d 159, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (holding injunctions cannot be
issued based on past findings of discrimination alone). See also Near v.
Minnesota, 288 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (holding courts do not engage in a
practice of depriving First Amendment rights as a punishment for an offense).
40. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 833 (5th
Cir. 1979).
41. See NAACP, 693 F.2d at 1370 (issuing Title VII injunction designed to
end discriminatory hiring practices of the City of Evergreen). In NAACP, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the district court to permanently
enjoin the City of Evergreen and all its agents from "engaging in any
employment practice, including recruitment, appointment, promotion,
retention, or any other personnel action, for the purpose or with the effect of
discriminating against any employee ... on the ground of race or color." Id. at
1371.
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however, courts began to assume greater responsibility for
eliminating workplace discrimination and started issuing more
assertive injunctions. Judges began explicitly commanding
employers to adopt formal anti-discrimination and harassment
policies for the protection of their employees43 and in some rare
cases actually enjoined actionable workplace speech.44 The use of
broad injunctions, particularly orders limiting speech, has
engendered nationwide controversy within the courts and
especially outside of them.45 Although few judges in the past were
willing to expand the scope of injunctive relief,46 recent decisions
42. Id.
43. See Harris v. Int'l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1527-28 (1991) (D. Me.
1991), amended by 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991) (issuing an injunction
ordering employer to cease any activity or policy that "condones racial
harassment"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1534 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (granting injunction ordering defendant-company to
develop and implement anti-discrimination policy and handbook for its
employees). The court stated the policy had to provide employees with
education about Title VII, training on how to deal with abusive and hostile
environments, and a system for reporting complaints of injured workers. Id.
The court stated such an injunction appropriately remedied a hostile work
Id. But see Hopkins v. Price
environment sexual harassment claim.
Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1216 (D.D.C. 1990) (declining to issue an
injunction because the order would force the court to monitor the potential for
sexual stereotyping in future promotions at defendant's legal firm). The Court
found injunctions, as a remedy for Title VII violations, were intrusive and
unnecessary. Id.
44. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854-55 (1999). See
EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 1990)
(enjoining employees from using racially abusive language in the workplace);
EEOC v. Fotios, 671 F.Supp. 454, 455 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (issuing an injunction
which permanently enjoined [defendants] from giving any negative references
to any person or company, including prospective employers, regarding the
affected class members).
45. See Mark N. Mallery & Robert Rachal, Report on the Growing Tension
Between First Amendment and HarassmentLaw, 12 LAB. L.J. 475, 477 (1997)
(disagreeing with Aguilar majority's determination that the injunction issued
was not a prior restraint). Mallery and Rachal maintain that Aguilar "is
contrary to long-established lines of authority holding the consequences of the
listener's reactions to speech may not justify suppression, absent the need to
prevent violence." Id. at 478. See also Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does
"Hostile Work Environment" HarassmentLaw Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627, 644
(1997) (discussing how injunctions in harassment cases erroneously ban
isolated statements which do not rise to the level of contributing to a hostile
environment). But see Price-Huish, supra note 8, at 214 (praising the courts
that have issued specific speech injunctions and advocating further judicial
use of injunctive relief as the primary protection for employees injured in the
workplace).
46. See McLaughlin, 784 F. Supp. at 977 (rejecting plaintiffs plea for an
injunctive order enjoining defendants from speaking about her in a derogatory
The court stated it would encounter an "insurmountable
manner).
constitutional barrier" in enforcing the plaintiffs proposed remedy because the
order would authorize the court to impose a prior restraint on defendant's
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indicate a new willingness by courts to enjoin actionable workplace
speech despite the evident First Amendment implications.47
C. The PriorRestraint Doctrine
The primary reason courts hesitate to issue injunctions
restricting speech is that such orders often create an invalid prior
restraint of constitutionally protected free speech. 4'8 A "prior
restraint" is a judicial or administrative order forbidding certain
speech that is issued before the speech occurs.' 9 Permanent
injunctions that forbid specific speech are "classic examples of
prior restraints."50
The American legal system is wary of prior restraints because
of the principle that a democratic society prefers to punish
individuals who abuse the rights of speech after the violation
occurs rather than prior to it." This approach is based on the
theory that courts rarely know in advance what an individual will
say before he speaks; thus, the risk of impermissible censorship is
substantial when speech injunctions are involved."2 Faced with
such high risks, courts only approve government-imposed
restraints on a citizen's freedom of speech in certain very limited
circumstances. 3
Although not invalid per se, prior restraints are the "most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.""'
As such, a prior restraint is subject to a heavy
presumption of constitutional invalidity.55 Proponents of a prior
speech. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that the plaintiffs request ignored
the "overwhelming" precedent prohibiting prior restraints on speech. Id.
47. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 856-57
(1999) (holding that specific speech injunctive relief does not act as a prior

restraint of speech after a court has deemed an environment to be hostile or
abusive).
48. Id. at 878. (Mosk, J., dissenting)

49. Id. at 878-79.
50. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
51. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 589 (1976) (Brennan, J.,

concurring).
52. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc. 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994)

(holding that the high risk that injunctions will censor protected speech

requires a "somewhat more stringent application of general First Amendment
principles" to speech injunctions).
53. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 833
(1979) (holding speech may be restrained in situations where it would be
subject to regulation without violating the First Amendment). See also N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (stating that speech may

be regulated when it will "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage.").

54. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559.
55. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (holding any
prior restraint is subject to a "heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity.").
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restraint must prove that restricting protected speech is
warranted due to specific compelling circumstances despite the
broad guarantees of the First Amendment. 56 Not surprisingly,
proponents rarely meet that burden of persuasion.
Remedial speech injunctions, similar to those issued in
Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car System57 and Snell v. Suffolk County, 8
act as a prior restraint. Courts frequently deem them invalid
because they regulate the content and viewpoint of specific speech
restrictions prohibited by First Amendment doctrine. 9 Such
injunctions tend to prohibit speech based on its expressive
message" and its potential to offend the person who hears it."'
Issuing an order that prohibits the utterance of words which
convey and embody a particular bias obstructs the free flow of
viewpoints central to the speech guarantees of the First
Amendment."

56. See Eaves, 601 F.2d at 833 (noting that the Supreme Court has never
explicitly defined the burden placed on a proponent of prior restraint). The
courts only requirement seems to be that the proponent demonstrate
compelling circumstances. Id. See generally R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
395 (1992) (holding that states have a compelling interest in eradicating racial
or ethnic discrimination in housing and employment). However, the Court
clarified that the means a state uses to combat discrimination must not collide
with the principles of the First Amendment. Id.
57. Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 850.
58. Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 532 (1985).
59. See Rosenburger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
828 (1995) (holding injunction that regulates speech on the basis of its topic is
content-based regulation and therefore presumptively invalid). Furthermore,
the Court regards viewpoint-based regulation as "an egregious form of content
discrimination" because it tends to have a chilling or deterrent effect on the
particular views or biases that a speaker expresses about a topic. Id. at 829.
The Court stated that regulation that has such an effect on speech is
presumptively invalid. Id.
60. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867-68 (1997).
61. Id. See Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 891 (Brown, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the remedial speech injunction upheld by the majority creates a dangerous
precedent that an idea that happens to offend someone in the workplace is not
constitutionally protected despite the principles of the First Amendment). See
also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating the whole purpose of
the First Amendment is to promote the free exchange of ideas, even those
society considers offensive or disagreeable). See generally Nat. Socialist Party
v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (upholding the First Amendment right of
group of neo-Nazis to march through the streets of predominantly Jewish
community of Skokie, Illinois while wearing Nazi uniforms displaying
swastikas); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (noting America places
such a high value on the free exchange of ideas that even offensive ideas are
judicially tolerated and safeguarded). In Cohen, unpopular views were being
expressed. Id. at 25. However, as the Court stated, "one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric" and therefore deserves constitutional protection. Id.
62. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 59697 (1995) (noting that when Title VII is applied to sexual harassment claims
founded solely on verbal insults or pictorial or literary matter, the statute
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Despite the tendency of injunctions to regulate expressive
content and specific viewpoints, a court may nonetheless issue an
injunction if the proponent can prove the restrictions on speech are
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that the
injunction is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."63 Courts have
repeatedly held that the state has a compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination in the workplace.64 However, utilizing
injunctions as prior restraints is not the preferred means of
achieving that goal.6" Indeed, courts rarely find that a speech
restraint is warranted without sufficient evidence that allowing
the speech creates
a cognizable danger of recurring
discrimination.66
Even if the plaintiff can prove there is a
compelling necessity for a permanent injunction, the court must
still ensure that the injunction is not so overbroad or vague that it
would encompass protected speech.67
D. Damages as an Alternative Remedy Under Title VII
In 1991, Congress passed a radical set of amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in an effort to better remedy the injured
party in Title VII cases.68 The long awaited changes explicitly
imposes content and viewpoint based restrictions on speech). See also R.A.V.
v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-93 (1992) (holding that a state may not prohibit
only those fighting words expressing a viewpoint of racial intolerance).
63. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1994). See
also Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
64. Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 852. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-93.
65. See McLauglin, 784 F. Supp. 961, 977 (1992) (rejecting plaintiffs
contention that Title VII authorizes the court to impose a prior restraint on
speech that does not amount to fighting words or is obscene). The plaintiff in
McLaughlin alleged that after she was fired, the defendants "blacklisted" her
and thus prevented her from getting another job in New York. Id. at 977. At
trial, she sought damages and a permanent injunction enjoining the
defendants from speaking about her in a derogatory manner. Id. at 977. The
court denied the request for injunctive relief holding that a plaintiff is not
entitled to an injunction against the defendant's future speech. Id. at 978.
66. See Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 703 F. Supp. 466, 468 (1989) (holding
that permanent injunctive relief compelling dissemination of comprehensive
anti-sexual harassment policy was inappropriate in this case). The court
found no cognizable danger of recurrent discriminatory behavior for two
reasons: first, the employee primarily responsible for creating the hostile
environment no longer worked for the defendant company; second, the
defendant had already created and implemented an anti-sexual harassment
policy after the lawsuit. Id. See also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107
(1983) (holding "emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a
sufficient basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future
injury by the defendant.").
67. Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 876.
68. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 148 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549 (finding compelling need to permit recovery of legal relief
under Title VII to make victims of intentional discrimination whole for their
losses).
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enabled plaintiffs to sue for compensatory and even punitive
damages in addition to injunctive relief, formerly the only
available remedy.69 The amendments focused on furthering the
stated congressional purpose behind Title VII of making a person
"whole" and fully compensating the injured party for proven
legitimate pain and suffering.7"
Additionally, by passing the new amendments, Congress
intended to encourage employers to privately eliminate
discriminatory workplace environments, and thus, eliminate the
need for judicial interference in the workplace. 7'
Under the
amended version of Title VII, companies could be forced to pay
large damages awards to injured employees and face costly
litigation if they refused to act proactively to prevent workplace
discrimination.7 2 Because of this, many argue that the new legal
remedies are the most effective deterrent for Title VII violations.73
II.

THE THREAT TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT: SPECIFIC SPEECH
INJUNCTIONS AS INVALID PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON WORKPLACE

69. Id. See Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc., No. 94-6365, 1995
WL 307558, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 11, 1995) (noting that prior to 1991
amendments, plaintiffs were restricted to reinstatement, back pay, and front
pay in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief).
70. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (stating the
purpose of Title VII is to sufficiently remedy persons for injuries suffered
because of unlawful employment discrimination); cf. International Bd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 (1977) (indicating that
compensation and deterrence are equally important under Title VII).
71. See Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to
Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the
Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 175, 191 (1993)
(discussing how the threat of injunctive relief alone did not compel employers
to eradicate their discriminatory workplace environments). However, the
author argues that when Title VII was amended to include the prospect of a
back pay award or compensatory damages, employers suddenly became more
willing to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices. Id. at
191. Injunctive relief provided no such catalyst for employers. Id.
72. See Ronald James, Protecting Your Company Against Sexual
Harassment,FOUNDRY MANAGEMENT & TECHNOLOGY, Aug. 1, 1998, 1998 WL
10890807, at *2 (discussing how plaintiffs' attorneys have found ways to get
around the $300,000 liability cap of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, depending on
the size of the company). Attorneys often combine Title VII claims with state
tort allegations, such as assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy or violation of public policy, in order to be able to
recover larger damages awards. Id. Moreover, state anti-discrimination laws
may not provide for damage caps and thus may also be joined as part of the
federal claim. Id.
73. See Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 894 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
few employers would continue to tolerate discriminatory speech in the
workplace after shouldering the cost of litigation and large damages awards).
"I think that remedy (damages) is sufficient to deter any 'unwarranted racial
discrimination." Id.
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EXPRESSION

This section will demonstrate how specific speech injunctions
in Title VII are presumptively invalid because they act as a prior
restraint on speech in the workplace 4 and regulate speech solely
on the basis of its content and viewpoint."8 Although the state has
a compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination,"
specific speech injunctions are not necessary to achieve that goal."
Moreover, courts are unable to narrowly tailor the injunctions to
only restrict unprotected speech."8 Damages are the proper
remedy for hostile work environment claims because they are
more effective in eliminating past discrimination and preventing it
in the future and do not pose the constitutional problems that
hinder injunctions."9
A. Specific Speech Injunctions Act as a PriorRestraint
A prior restraint is a judicial order forbidding certain
communications before they occur.8"
Thus, specific speech
injunctions, such as those issued in Aguilar and Snell, are
examples of prior restraints. 8 For instance, the Aguilar order
forbade employees from saying specific racial or ethic epithets at
work, no matter the context of their usage or whether the listener
welcomed the speech." In effect, the order "freezes" the speaker's
ability to communicate protected speech freely and, like most
injunctions, acts as a prior restraint.83 Thus, specific speech
injunctions, which bar the speaking of protected speech prior to

74.
75.
76.
77.

McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961, 978 (N.D.N.Y 1992).
Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-93 (1992).
See McLaughlin, 784 F. Supp. at 978 (noting that the Supreme Court

will not authorize prior restraints when other remedies exist to correct any
harm that might occur from the injurious speech).
78. See Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 885 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (demonstrating
how issued injunction was not narrowly tailored).
79. Id. at 893-94; James, supra note 72, at *2.
80. Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 878-79.
81. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (holding that
permanent injunctions that forbid specific speech are classic examples of prior
restraints). The Aguilar and Snell injunctions both forbid certain speech prior
to utterance and therefore acted as a prior restraint on the speaker's ability to
speak freely.

82. Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 850. See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (noting whether workplace speech is in

fact discriminatory depends on "surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships" between speaker and listener). Moreover, the Court stated that
hostile environment determinations can rarely be made just by words being
spoken or acts being performed. Id.
83. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867-68 (1997) (holding injunctions
prohibiting speech solely because of communicative impact are prior restraints
and content-based).
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utterance, directly implicate the established rights preserved in
the First Amendment.84
B. Specific Speech Injunctions Regulate Speech On the Basis of
Content and Viewpoint

Consistently, courts have held that injunctions that prohibit
speech on the basis of topic are clearly content-based regulations
and are therefore presumptively invalid under the Constitution."
Similarly, the First Amendment prohibits government suppression
of free expression of specific viewpoints."6
Remedial speech
injunctions, such as those the Aguilar and Snell courts issued, are
content and viewpoint sensitive because they impose special
prohibitions on speakers who express unpopular, even offensive
views on disfavored subjects. 7
Both the Aguilar and Snell courts held that future use of
racial and ethnic epithets in the workplace is enjoinable when
such speech was previously found to constitute employment
discrimination."8 In both cases, the courts justified enjoining
future offensive speech solely because of its potential to offend
some employees. For example, the Snell court justified enjoining
corrections officers from speaking racial slurs such as "spic" and
"nigger" towards inmates because they were "harsh" and "crude"
expressions. 9 Such orders restrict the content and viewpoint of a
speaker's future communication. By forcing a speaker to exclude
words that the judge determines to be offensive, the courts are in
84. See McLaughlin, 784 F. Supp. at 978 (stating injunctions chill speech
with the threat of criminal or civil sanctions but prior restraints "freeze"
speech because they remove it from society before society has opportunity to
hear the message).
85. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
86. See id. (stating that courts regard viewpoint discrimination as "an
egregious form of content discrimination" and thus invalid under First
Amendment analysis).
87. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, 116 S. Ct. 2338, 2350 (1995) (holding that gays and lesbians must be
allowed to march under their own, identifiable banners in the privately
sponsored St. Patrick's Day parade). "While the law is free to promote all
sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened [the ordinance's]
purpose.. .

."

Id.

88. Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 862 (1999); Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F.Supp.
521, 526 (1985).
89. See Snell, 611 F. Supp. at 531 (suggesting an absolute ban was
warranted because of the was corrections officers expressed racial and ethnic
slurs, an absolute ban was warranted). Moreover, the Snell court justified its
complete prohibition of racial joking by stating "only a radical shock to the
mores can succeed in bringing home to these officers the necessity of
eschewing overt hostility so that equal working conditions for all employees
can exist as Congress intended." Id.
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effect removing the message of racial intolerance from society."
Moreover, although racial slurs are detestable, they do not fall
with any traditionally recognized area of unprotected speech. 9
Moreover, courts are mistaken in concluding that enjoining
the future use of slurs or derogatory epithets in the workplace
would not act as suppression of speech by prior restraint.92
Certainly, no judge can predetermine the effect of using any
specific slur from a list of verboten words.93 It is impermissible
and unlawful for a court to create regulations based on unfounded
presumptions of what the speaker might say and how his
communication might affect the listener.94 For the courts to permit
such assumptions would be to allow repression of speech before
the consequences of its utterance could occur.95
90. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-393 (1992) (holding that a
state cannot mandate specific prohibition of fighting words which express a
viewpoint of racial intolerance).
91. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding
fighting words, which by their utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of peace, are not constitutionally protected). See also Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech); Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d
666, 675 (3rd Cir. 1991) (stating that defamatory speech is not protected by
the First Amendment).
92. See Dailey v. San Francisco, 44 P. 458, 459 (1896) (stating that the right
to express oneself cannot be restrained before it is exercised).
The right of a citizen to freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments
is unlimited, but he is responsible at the hands of the law for an abuse of
that right. He shall have no censor over him to whom he must apply for
permission to speak, write or publish, but he shall be held accountable
to the law for what he speaks, what he writes, and what he publishes.
Id.
93. See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)
(dictating that a hostile environment determination requires complete
examination of circumstances in the workplace). The Harris Court implied
that speech alone, without regard to its frequency, its context, or its effect on
the listener, could create a hostile environment. Id.; Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (noting that whether workplace
speech is in fact discriminatory depends on "surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships" between speaker and listener).
94. See Forsyth, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992)
(stating that listener's reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for
regulation). In Forsyth, the county argued that an ordinance assessing a fee
towards individuals who wished to assemble and parade was constitutional
although the fee assessed for those activities directly depended on an
administrator's measure and examination of the message being expressed. Id.
at 134-35. The county argued that the ordinance was content neutral because
it was aimed only at the secondary effect, the cost of adequately determining
proper security for parade participants. Id. The Court rejected the county's
argument stating that presumptions that speech might offend or excite
individuals did not justify financially burdening that speech. Id.
95. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867-68 (1997) (holding an injunction is
content-based when it prohibits speech for its communicative impact and its
potential to offend the person who hears it). Content-based regulations are
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C. There is No Compelling State Interest in Specific Speech
Injunctions
Despite the presumption that specific speech injunctions act
as invalid prior restraints, courts might allow such orders if the
government could demonstrate a compelling state interest that
justifies the prior restraint.96
Undoubtedly, the state has a
compelling interest in abolishing employment discrimination.9 7
Indeed, a judge tasked with the responsibility of remedying a
hostile workplace must issue a remedy that both corrects past
discrimination and prevents future discriminatory conduct.98
However, there is no clear and convincing proof that specific
speech injunctions, especially when they act as a prior restraint on
protected speech, are indispensable to promote the state's
interest. 99
The argument that speech restrictions are necessary to
promote the state's interest adequately is speculative and riddled
with defects.
Proponents of specific speech injunctive relief
typically argue a defendant's prior acts of discrimination, which
ultimately lead to legal liability, justify a prior restraint.' 0 The
typical theory rests on the unfounded posit that a bigot who
violates the law is likely to do so again unless prevented.10 '
presumptively invalid under the First Amendment. Id. at 867. Courts should
not penalize speech before it is known what was said, to whom, and with what
effect. Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 878 (1999)
(Mosk, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge in Aguilar stressed such factors
can never be determined in advance and thus deserve constitutional
protection. Id. But see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628
(1984) (stating that "potentially expressive activities that produce special
harms distinct from their communicative impact

...

are entitled to no

constitutional protection"). See also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697,
707 (1986) (finding that speech restriction did not constitute an invalid prior
restraint). The Court in Arcara limited its holding to situations where the
prior restraint is not directed at the expressive content of the speech and does
not substantially eliminate other opportunities for expression. Id.
96. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
97. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (holding that a state
may prohibit ethnic and racial discrimination and has a compelling interest in
doing so).
98. McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961, 975 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
99. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, xxx (1999)
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
100. NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 693 F.2d 1367, 1370 (1982).
101. See EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1544 (1987)
(holding that an employer who takes curative actions to remedy a
discriminatory work environment only after being sued fails to provide
sufficient assurances it will not repeat the violation to justify denial of
injunctive relief). See also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765
(1994) (holding that an injunction passes constitutional muster, when it
targets and eliminates "no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to
remedy.").
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However, courts have consistently ruled that such generalizations
do not present a compelling argument that there is a "real and
immediate threat of future injury" thus necessitating a prior
restraint on speech.0 2 To hold otherwise would force the court to
constantly speculate as to the content and effect of the future
speech of the defendant prior to utterance-a role courts
consistently refuse to perform.1 1 3 While some may argue that the
judiciary has a responsibility to encourage conduct that combats
racial discrimination, 4 courts cannot justify an invalid prior
restraint based on their interest in preventing bigots from
conveying their message of intolerance. 0 ' To do so would not only
violate the fundamental principles behind the First Amendment
but threaten the very ideals of a democratic society.'
Moreover, the government cannot meet its weighty burden of
persuasion by relying on a weak conjecture that a person's prior
unlawful acts necessarily predicts future unlawful behavior. Such
a conclusion defies common sense and legal logic. An employer
who has previously engaged in verbal harassment that produced a
hostile environment may not thereafter be enjoined from engaging
in or permitting similar offensive speech on the theory that it has
the potential to produce a hostile work environment in the future.
Potential discrimination does not legally amount to a real and
immediate threat of harm. Thus, there is no compelling legal

102. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 833
(1979).
103. See In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (1st Cir. 1986)
(stating that the court asked to order a prior restraint necessarily must judge
the contested speech in the abstract).
104. See Mari Matsuda, A Public Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2357-58 (1989) (promoting an approach
where racist speech is treated as a separate category of unprotected speech).
Matsuda argues that setting aside the worst forms of racist speech for special
treatment is a neutral approach that will better serve First Amendment
interests. Id. at 2357. Alternatively, she suggests that courts that are
uncomfortable with creating such precedent may instead stretch existing First
Amendment exceptions, such as the fighting words doctrine and the
content/conduct distinction to justify a valid restraint on racist speech. Id.
However, she acknowledges that these approaches ultimately weaken First
Amendment protections. Id.
105. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 334 (7th
Cir. 1985) (rejecting attempts by the government to regulate written material
in order to prevent readers from developing certain ideas). The court held that
an Indianapolis ordinance that created a civil rights cause of action allowing
women to sue pornographers because they further the "subordination" of
women was unconstitutional. Id. at 332. The court reasoned the so-called
"civil rights" measure was mere censorship disguised. Id.
106. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.").
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basis for granting specific speech injunctive relief in employment
discrimination cases.
D. Specific Speech Injunctive Orders are Overbroad
Similarly, specific speech injunctions cannot be narrowly
drawn to further the state's interest in preventing a recurrence of
a hostile work environment. '°7 This is due to the fact that despite
the specificity of the description of the prohibited words in such
injunctions, they still "burden more speech than necessary to serve
a significant government interest," and thus are overly broad.'0 8
One major constitutional problem plaguing specific speech
injunctive relief is the remedy's failure to precisely target the
"evil" that Title VII aims to combat without also impeding
protected expressive communication.10'9 By design, these specific
speech injunctions such as the ones used in Aguilar prohibit every
explicit utterance of a racial or ethnic slur in the workplace, not
just the utterances that actually produce a hostile work
environment." ° As such, the orders allow the suppression of
individual incidents of offensive speech, even when that speech, on
its own, does not create a hostile environment."'
Such a situation arose in the Aguilar case where the
injunction prohibited the defendant from using certain epithets to
address or describe Hispanic employees anytime and anywhere in
the workplace."'
The injunction went beyond precluding the
defendants from continuing their unlawful activity. It directly
targeted protected speech."3 First, it restrained the defendant
from making future offensive statements at work even if the
statements were made outside of the presence and knowledge of
plaintiffs or other Hispanic employees."'
Furthermore, the
injunction enjoined the defendant from expressing his
discriminatory speech towards employees who would not be
injured by the speech nor perceive it as creating a hostile
107. See generally Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1998) (holding a
regulation is narrowly drawn, for First Amendment purposes, if "it targets and
eliminates no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy").
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Volokh, supra note 5, at 1815 (arguing that once speech injunction
is ordered, the standard for liability in harassment law is altered). Volokh
claims a hostile work environment can be the sum of various speakers saying
things that alone would not create a Title VII claim. Id. But by preventing all
offensive statements, he argues courts are suppressing speech that may
actually not create a hostile environment. Id.
111. Id.
112. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys. Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 848 (Cal. 1999).
113. See id. at 878-79 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (arguing that offensive speech
should be protected unless and until it produces a demonstrable harmful
effect).
114. Id. at 849.
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environment."5 As a result, the injunction extended far beyond
the precisely targeted evil of the discrimination by prohibiting
future protected
speech that would not create a discriminatory
11 6
environment.

Even if specific speech injunctions, such as the Aguilar order,
could be narrowly drawn to prohibit the defendant only from
directing racial slurs to the particular employees he previously
harassed, they would still prohibit more speech than necessary.
The critical factor is that not every utterance of a racial or ethnic
slur in the workplace violates Title VII." 7 Rather, a Title VII
plaintiff must show that the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory insult and ridicule which is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the workplace conditions."' Specific speech
injunctions vitiate this standard. 19 Once the injunction is issued,
there no longer is any need to show what was said, how often it
was said, or what the surrounding circumstances were, all critical
factors in determining whether a hostile environment existed. 120
Rather, an isolated use of a listed epithet, however repugnant,
immediately spawns civil or even criminal liability as a violation
of
2
the injunction even though it could not violate Title VII.' '

E. An Award of Damages is the Best Remedy for Title VII Hostile
Work Environment Violations

The best and most effective remedy for a Title VII violation is
an award of damages. Traditionally, the courts have preferred
granting legal remedies instead of injunctive relief. 2 2 Damages
are more favorable for redressing workplace discrimination claims
because they eliminate the complex constitutional implications
inherent in speech injunctions. Moreover, damages awards are
more capable of discouraging discrimination in the workplace,
which is the whole purpose behind Title VII.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 879 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
119. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1815.
120. Id.
121. But see EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381,
384 (D. Minn. 1980) (finding a hostile environment cannot be predicated on a
few isolated incidents). The court in Murphy Motor Freight Lines held that
racial comments uttered as part of casual conversation are incidental and do
not constitute Title VII violations. Id.
122. See Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 75

(7th Cir. 1992) (stating that damages awards are the preferred remedy,
particularly in contractual cases). As such, the proponent of an injunction
must demonstrate that a damage award is inadequate and a denial of
injunctive relief will cause "irreparable harm." Id. The Walgreen court stated
that irreparable in the injunction context means not rectifiable by a final
judgment decree. Id.
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Proponents of injunctive relief argue that prior restraints are
necessary because there is no guarantee that damages will
eliminate workplace discrimination. 123 On the contrary, an award
of damages, particularly in light of the potential for large
monetary awards,'
will serve as an adequate and effective
deterrent.125 It is illogical to conclude that once a Title VII
violation has been found and damages awarded, an employer
would continue to tolerate recurring discriminatory speech in the
workplace. If damages are consistently awarded, companies will
find it in their best interest to develop internal mechanisms to
abolish workplace discrimination rather than be sued again.
Thus, the threat of costly repeated litigation and potentially large
damage awards would play a crucial role in the remedial process."'
Moreover, damages and not specific speech injunction, further
the compensatory goal behind Title VII. While Title VII has
always concentrated on providing a means for correcting the social
problems created by workplace discrimination, the goal of the Act
has recently shifted more towards adequate compensation for
victims." 7 In passing the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights

123. See McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961, 977 (1992) (denying
plaintiffs request to prospectively enjoin defendants from speaking about her
in a derogatory manner). In McLaughlin, the plaintiff argued the compelling
circumstances surrounding her sexual harassment in the office entitled her to
guarantees from the court that her employer could be restrained from in effect
"blacklisting" her within the labor field. Id. The court disagreed. Id. The
court rationalized that such an injunction would constitute an invalid prior
restraint on the defendant's speech. Id. It rationalized that the damage the
plaintiff would suffer from having further negative references spoken about
her within the working community would "pale" in comparison to the damages
created by an invalid prior restraint. Id. But see FIss, supra note 29, at 75-77
(arguing that remedying a civil rights violation with monetary damages is
often not an adequate remedial measure).
124. See also James, supra note 72, at *2; see also Zemelman, supra note 71,
at 191.
125. See Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 882 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (stating that a threat
of repeated litigation is a potent remedy for eliminating employment
discrimination). Justice Mosk noted that the high costs of defending litigation
and jury awards-including compensatory damages, attorney's fees and
punitive damages-are more effective in preventing future workplace
discrimination than the possibility of an individual supervisor being jailed for
contempt. Id.
126. United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding
backpay awards, the only form of damages allowed prior to 1991 Amendments
to Civil Rights Act of 1964, serve a critical role in the remedial process). The
N.L. Industries court reasoned that if backpay is consistently awarded by
courts, companies would find it in their best interest to remedy their
employment procedures without court intervention. Id.
127. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 148 (1991) (noting that victims of
intentional discrimination often endure substantial economic losses). The
Education and Labor Committee, which conducted hearings prior to
recommending the 1991 Amendments, heard testimony from several victims of
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Act of 1964, Congress recognized that earlier remedies available
for injured plaintiffs-such as allowing victims only to recover
equitable relief for proved Title VII violations-were not
accomplishing the Act's stated goal of making victims "whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful discrimination."'
As
such, by allowing for compensatory and punitive damages, the
amendments emphasized Congress' intent that Title VII be
treated more like a traditional tort. 129
Implicitly, the new changes also indicated the importance
placed on compensating victims to the fullest extent."' This is
precisely the result Title VII was meant to achieve. If a plaintiff
suffers years of severe mental and emotional distress,
embarrassment and humiliation, it is unreasonable to assume that
a specific speech injunction could adequately compensate him for
his injuries."' For one, a specific speech injunction is inherently
limited in its powers and by definition, it can only prevent future
harassment. 12
In no way could it provide a means for
compensating the victim for his past physical or mental
suffering.'
As such, injured parties demonstrating extensive
suffering due to workplace discrimination can only receive partial
relief, far from the "whole" Congress intended.'
Not only is an award of damages more within the spirit of
sexual harassment. Id. The committee concluded that discrimination does
cost employers and employees money in terms of lost wages, missed work days
and medical insurance costs. Id.
128. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 148.
129. See Zemelman, supra note 71, at 188 (arguing that Title VII has evolved
into "a public-policy enforcing statute, designed to promote employer

responsibility, to a compensatory, tort-like statute, aimed at making victims
whole").
130. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 148.
131. Cf. Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986)
(finding little incentive for a Title VII plaintiff to bring forth a complaint when

injunctive relief is the only remedy available). If the plaintiff can only get an
injunction forcing her employer to end the discrimination, few plaintiffs will
want to undertake expensive court costs and endure the humiliation of
bringing forth their difficult situations. Id.
132. Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)
(holding court has responsibility to render decree which eliminates the

discriminatory effects of past discrimination while preventing future acts once
a Title VII plaintiff was successful), with Mitchell, 629 F. Supp. at 643

(arguing the most a successful Title VII plaintiff could recover is an "order to
her supervisor and to her employer to treat her with the dignity she
deserves").
133. Mitchell, 629 F. Supp. at 643.

See also Humphrey v. Southwestern

Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832, 834-35 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (holding that
recognition of psychological injuries suffered from discrimination is proper in
Civil Rights Act cases). The Humphrey court was one of the few courts to
recognize that victims of discrimination often suffered from psychological

injuries, rather than physical injuries. Id.
134. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418.
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Title VII's remedial function, it is judicially more efficient than
issuing an injunction. By its nature, legal relief provides a final
decree and ends a court's involvement in a case.'35 In contrast,
injunctions require continuing court supervision. 3 ' The court
must monitor the workplace to insure that the speech injunction is
being fully upheld both by employers and employees.3 7 Thus,
injunctions inevitably undercut the efficiency of the remedial goals
provided by Title VII.
Moreover, forcing a court to maintain such a supervisory role
is costly. 3 ' Courts will have to devote substantial resources of
time and money to preventing violations as well as remedying
them."9 Because specific speech injunctions prohibit isolated use
of offensive words, court calendars could become overwhelmed just
with resolving claims that injunctions have been violated. 4 ° Such
a result is an intolerable abuse of judicial economy.

III. MAKING THE VICTIM "WHOLE": REDRESSING DISCRIMINATION
THROUGH DAMAGES AWARDS

Clearly, proponents of specific speech injunctions cannot
overcome the longstanding presumption in the courts that such
orders act as an invalid prior restraint on speech.
Speech
injunctions are unconstitutional and ineffective in eradicating
workplace discrimination.
However, damage awards offer a
legally sound remedy for injured Title VII plaintiffs.
Moreover, damages act as a more effective deterrent to
workplace discrimination because they force employers to comply
with Title VII regulations under pain of potentially expensive
litigation.
Thus, courts must stop issuing specific speech
injunctions and instead adopt a policy to consistently award
135. Walgreen Co., 966 F.2d at 276.
136. Id.
137. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1215 (D. D.C.
1990) (refusing an injunction because it would force the court to monitor a
company indefinitely in order to ensure it discontinued discriminatory hiring
practices).
138. See Walgreen Co., 966 F.2d at 276 (finding that pain and suffering are
not easily quantifiable). However, the court believes a "crude estimate" of
those types of damages is better than granting a wrong-doer a meaningless
punishment. Id.
139. See N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d at 378 (ordering the court to monitor
a company's practices to ensure it complies with obligations until Title VII).
The injunction ordered specifically maintains the district court's jurisdiction
over the company, implicating its supervisory position over future
discrimination. Id.
140. See generally Volokh, supra note 5, at 1813-14 (arguing that injunctions
transform the standard of liability under Title VII). Employers today are not
just liable for those actions of employees that create a hostile environment but
also those violations of the injunction. Id. Each violation creates liability and
thus requires a judicial intervention. Id.
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damages to injured Title VII plaintiffs.
Courts have a
responsibility to injured Title VII plaintiffs to ensure
discrimination stops and will not occur again in the future. By
adopting such a policy, courts would deter workplace
discrimination, which is Title VII's primary purpose.
CONCLUSION

Critics of specific speech injunctions have correctly
determined that when such orders are applied to Title VII
violations the injunctions endanger free speech guarantees.
Although courts have a duty to remedy and prevent discrimination
in the workplace, their responsibility cannot quash the rights of
citizens to be protected from invalid prior restraint on their
speech.
But courts do just that when they issue speech
injunctions.
In today's business world companies go to great lengths to
avoid lengthy and costly litigation. As such, the possibility of
paying repeated large damages awards to employees creates an
incentive for employers to implement their own antidiscrimination policies for their workplace.
Thus, damages
awards, not speech injunctions, are the most effective legal tool for
eliminating workplace discrimination for the present and future
workforce.

